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Faceted Execution is a linguistic paradigm for dynamic information-ow control. Under faceted execution, secure program
data is represented by faceted values: decision trees that encode how the data should appear to its owner (represented by a
label) versus everyone else. When labels are allowed to be rst-class (i.e., predicates that decide at runtime which data to
reveal), faceted execution enables policy-agnostic programming: a programming style that allows privacy policies for data to
be enforced independently of code that computes on that data.
To date, implementations of faceted execution are relatively heavyweight: requiring either changing the language runtime
or the application code (e.g., by using monads). Following Racket’s languages-as-libraries approach, we present Racets: an
implementation of faceted execution as a library of macros. Given Racket’s highly-expressive macro system, our imple-
mentation follows relatively directly from the semantics of faceted execution. To demonstrate how Racets can be used for
policy-agnostic programming, we use it to build a web-based game of Baleship. Our implementation sheds light on several
interesting issues in interacting with code wrien without faceted execution. Our Racets implementation is open source,
under development, and available online.
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1 INTRODUCTION
As information systems become more interconnected and complex, they consume an ever-growing amount
of private data. System designers communicate to users how their data may be used via a privacy policy.
Unfortunately, implementing such policies correctly is challenging: users oen have partial control over the
policy (e.g., whether their phone number is publicly visible or private) and policies can change frequently. Not
only can specic privacy policies be highly dynamic (dependent on runtime values), but the process of improving
privacy policies can be highly dynamic across time. As policies evolve, developers face massive (re)engineering
eorts to ensure that implementations continue to match the policy at every relevant point in the codebase.
Policy-agnostic programming is a linguistic paradigm that decouples the implementation of privacy policies
from the code that operates on sensitive data. is frees developers to write programs mostly as they would for
insecure code, without inserting specic logic to manage information-ow policies directly into application code.
Instead, data is labeled with its policy as it enters the system and such labels propagate through the program,
alongside data, as computation progresses. When a secure value needs to be introspected upon (or propagates
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outside the application), its policy can be invoked at this point dynamically. is paradigm aims to permit code
manipulating sensitive data to be wrien in a manner entirely orthogonal to policies themselves.
Faceted execution (FE) is a highly expressive language semantics enabling policy-agnostic programming [1]. In
FE, dynamic information-ow monitors instrument the program, encoding sensitive values as faceted values:
decision trees specifying dierent views of data according to dierent possible security labels. For example, the
faceted value 〈Alice ? #t  #f 〉 represents a value that should appear to Alice as #t and to everyone except Alice
as #f. Faceted execution propagates distinct facets of a value by extending core linguistic primitives (such as
function application). For example, consider the application (x #t) where x is 〈Alice ? λx . #t  not 〉. Racket’s
standard function application will fail here because Racket’s #%app expects a procedure rather than a facet. Instead,
the proper way to interpret function application on faceted values is to distribute the application over all (in
this case, both) facets, producing 〈Alice ? #t  #f 〉: if Alice is viewing, the application yielded true, otherwise it
yielded false, so both are computed until the value is explicitly observed with specied permissions. Many other
core forms (such as if, set!, etc…) require similar changes to handle faceted values correctly.
Policy-agnostic programming promotes the idea that programmers should be able to write programs “normally”,
without concerning themselves with how privacy policies are enforced. Unfortunately, the relatively foundational
linguistic changes required to enable faceted execution have hindered implementations thusfar. Dynamic
generation of rst-class security labels, tracking an arbitrary number of facets per value, and keeping faceted-
value trees in a canonical order, are all central challenges in any practical implementation. For example, the
rst implementation of FE (by Austin and Flanagan [1]) extended a JavaScript interpreter to account for faceted
values. Other implementations use monads [19] or rely upon third-party macro systems [22]. We know of no
existing implementation of FE that aims to interoperate seamlessly with code wrien in the host language. By
contrast, Scheme boasts a powerful hygienic macro system that allows essentially any linguistic form to be
modied arbitrarily.
In this paper we present Racets, an implementation of policy-agnostic programming in Racket via macros [9,
13]. Racets provides facilities for creating policies and faceting secure data with those policies. Racets also
extends several core forms in Racket to work with faceted values (our implementation is detailed in Section 4).
We have used Racets to implement a small server-based board-game (detailed in Sections 2 and 4). Relevant
related work is presented in section 6. We see Racets as a promising prototype for policy-agnostic programming
in Racket, and conclude with discussion of future directions in Section 7.
2 OVERVIEW OF FACETED EXECUTION
To introduce faceted execution more concretely, we present the implementation of Baleship, a small guessing
game, in Racets (this section presents a distilled version of our case study in Section 4). In this game each player
has a private board of coordinates, at which they place “ships”. e players hide their boards from each other as
play progresses in rounds. Each turn a player guesses the position of a ship on the other player’s board. If the
guess is successful the tile is removed from the board and a hit is declared publicly. Play ends once one player’s
board has no remaining tiles, at which point that player loses.
We implement game boards as lists of cons cells representing the (x ,y) coordinates of ships. Board creation
simply returns an empty list, and adding a piece is done via cons:
1 (define (makeboard) '())
2 (define (add-piece board x y) (cons (cons x y) board))
Next we dene mark-hit, which takes a player’s board and removes a piece if the guessed coordinate is present.
We return a pair of the updated board and a boolean indicating whether the guess was a hit:
3 (define (mark-hit board x y)
4 (if (null? board)
5 (cons board #f)
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6 (let* ([fst (car board)]
7 [rst (cdr board)])
8 (if (and (= (car fst) x)
9 (= (cdr fst) y))
10 (cons rst #t)
11 (let ([rst+b (mark-hit rst x y)])
12 (cons (cons fst
13 (car rst+b))
14 (cdr rst+b)))))))
Although mark-hit will operate on sensitive data (the game boards), it is wrien without any special machinery
to maintain the secrecy of board. Protecting data w.r.t. policies is instead handled automatically and implicitly by
a runtime monitor. When Alice and Bob want to play a game, they both create a label to protect their data. A
label is unique id mapped to a policy predicate that takes a key (e.g., the current user’s name) and returns true or
false to indicate permission for the label. Alice’s label is used to annotate the data she wants to be kept secret.
Supposing Alice chooses to be player 1, she may use the following label:
15 (define alice-label (let-label l (λ (x) (= 1 x))) l)
is code illustrates label creation, policy predicates, and the rst-class nature of labels. e policy predicate
(λ (x) (= 1 x)) grants permission to player 1 only and is associated with the dynamically generated label l
(returned and bound to alice-label). Bob would use a similar policy (but for player 2 instead of 1). At runtime,
the let-label form creates a label `A and binds it to a closure for its policy predicate. When Alice wants to
protect a value, she creates a facet annotated with her label and two branches. e positive (le) branch represents
the value as it should appear to her, and the negative (right) to everyone else:
16 (define alice-board
17 (facet alice-label (add-pieces (makeboard) x1 y1 ...) (?)))
In the above example, ? (lazy failure) is used in the negative branch to ensure execution will fail if Bob tries
to observe Alice’s secret gameboard. To observe Alice’s gameboard, Bob can try to use (obs e` ekey efac) form,
which takes a label, a key, and a faceted value. Explicit observation projects a single label e` in faceted value
efac to either its positive or negative facet, depending on whether the policy associated with e` returns true for
key ekey. If Bob tries to observe Alice’s board, the policy predicate will return false (from (= 1 2)) and Alice’s
negative facet ? will result.
In other applications, Alice may choose a sensible default value to reveal to others—she may even want to
create a nested facet. For example, a social-networking application may use a nested facet consisting of two
labels for `Friends and `Family. A user can then present three views of her social-media prole: p1 to her family,
containing her phone number and other contact information, p2 to her friends showing her interests, and p3 to
everyone else, showing only her name and email.
`Family
p1 `Friends
p2 p3
As a game of Baleship progresses, Alice and Bob make guesses in turn, and driver code calls the function
mark-hit with each of their respective (faceted) game boards to record the aack. However, because Alice and
Bob’s game boards are both faceted values, mark-hit cannot be directly applied as in normal execution. Instead,
faceted execution “splits” the evaluation of the function application over both facets, running it rst on the
positive branch, then again on the negative branch. Finally, the results of each branch are combined again to
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c ∈ const ::= ′() | #t | #f | . . .
x ∈ var ::= 〈program variables〉
e ∈ exp ::= c | x
| (λ (x) e) | (e e)
| (box e) | (unbox e) | (set! e e)
| (let-label x e e)
| (facet e e e)
| (obs e e e)
Fig. 1. Syntax of λFE.
produce a new faceted value. is allows FE to avoid needing to reason about labels and policies until an explicit
observation point where a policy is checked and a faceted value is projected to one of its facets.
Because the applied function can be stateful, faceted execution also maintains the current privilege level in a
program counter (PC). e program counter is a property of the current evaluation context and is used to build
facets when writes are made to the store in a privileged context. For example, if a stateful function “splits” when
applied on both the positive and negative facets of a value faceted by a label `, and on the positive branch the
function uses set! to mutate a variable x from 2 to 3, FE semantics will set x to 〈 ` ? 3  2 〉 so that the value
3 cannot be leaked from the secure context (speculative execution under the +` facet). is is because, for the
duration of the app “split”, the evaluation context records that all values are implicitly guarded by +` and then
−`, respectively. If the semantics for set! does not make this faceting explicit, a sensitive value can leak from
one PC to another. We expand upon these subtleties in Section 3, where we present a complete semantics for
faceted execution.
Aer making various moves, we eventually want to reveal the game boards, pulling the positive view out of
alice-board to display Alice’s board. To do this, we must observe the facet with an obs form. Because Alice’s
board is faceted with alice-label, we specify that we want to observe alice-label and pass in an argument to
that label showing that Alice is indeed the person observing the facet:
18 (obs alice-label 1 alice-board) ; Returns Alice 's board
3 A FORMAL SEMANTICS FOR FACETED EXECUTION
We now present a semantics for a core language (λFE) which includes facets. Our presentation largely mirrors
that of Austin et al. [3]. e syntax of our language—reminiscent of Scheme—is shown in Figure 1. λFE extends
the lambda calculus with references (which have interactions with facets in a subtle way) and three forms unique
to faceted execution: facet construction, label creation, and facet observation.
Our semantics is shown in Figure 2 [15]. As λFE is an extension of the lambda calculus with references, we
present the parts unique to faceted execution in red, while keeping the lambda calculus with references in blue.
Base values in our semantics include addresses (used for boxes), constants, and closures. We also include a kind
of lazy failure (?), which is necessary for dening store update within a protected context.
Values in our semantics are either (unfaceted) base values or facets composed of a label and two branches.
Facets can nest, allowing trees of faceted values. We use the term branches to refer to positive or negated labels.
Collections of branches dene the program counter pc , which tracks the set of branches in the current context.
For example, to apply a faceted function to a value (as in the application of 〈 ` ? λx . 0  λx . 1 〉), the semantics
rst applies λx . 0 while extending pc with +`, then applies the negative branch extending pc with −`.
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α ∈ addr = . . .
bv ∈ base-val ::= c | α | 〈λx . e, ρ〉 | ?
v ∈ faceted-val ::= bv | 〈α ?v  v 〉
b ∈ branch ::= +` | −`
pc ∈ PC = ℘(branch)
ρ ∈ env = var ⇀ v
σ ∈ store = addr ⇀ v
(Expression Evaluation) e, ρ,σ ⇓Epc σ ,v
Const
c, ρ,σ ⇓Epc σ , c
Var
x , ρ,σ ⇓Epc σ , ρ(x)
Lambda
λx . e, ρ,σ ⇓Epc σ , 〈λx . e, ρ〉
Apply
e1, ρ,σ ⇓Epc σ ′,v1 e2, ρ,σ ′ ⇓Epc σ ′′,v2
(v1 v2), ρ,σ ′′ ⇓Apc σ ′′′,v ′
(e1 e2), ρ,σ ⇓Epc σ ′′′,v ′
Box
e, ρ,σ ⇓Epc σ ′,v α < dom(σ ′)
σ ′′ = σ ′[α 7→ 〈〈pc ?v  ? 〉〉]
(box e), ρ,σ ⇓Epc σ ′′,α
Unbox
e, ρ,σ ⇓Epc σ ′,v
v ′ = read(σ ′,v,pc)
(unbox e), ρ,σ ⇓Epc σ ′,v ′
Set
e1, ρ,σ ⇓Epc σ ′,v1 e2, ρ,σ ′ ⇓Epc σ ′′,v2
σ ′′′ = write(σ ′′,v1,pc,v2)
(set! e1 e2), ρ,σ ⇓Epc σ ′′′,v2
(Facet Creation)
Fac-Create-Split
e1, ρ,σ ⇓Epc σ ′, ` {+`,−`} ∩ pc = 
e2, ρ,σ
′ ⇓Epc∪{+l } σ ′′,v1 e3, ρ,σ ′′ ⇓Epc∪{−l } σ ′′′,v2
v = 〈〈pc ∪ {+`} ?v1  v2 〉〉
(fac e1 e2 e3), ρ,σ ⇓Epc σ ′′′,v
Fac-Create-Pos
e1, ρ,σ ⇓Epc σ ′, `
+` ∈ pc
e2, ρ,σ
′ ⇓Epc σ ′′,v
(fac e1 e2 e3), ρ,σ ⇓Epc σ ′′,v
Fac-Create-Neg
e1, ρ,σ ⇓Epc σ ′, `
−` ∈ pc
e3, ρ,σ
′ ⇓Epc σ ′′,v
(fac e1 e2 e3), ρ,σ ⇓Epc σ ′′,v
(Label Creation / Observation)
Let-Label
e1, ρ,σ ⇓Epc σ ′, 〈λx . e, ρ ′〉
α < dom(σ ′) σ ′′ = σ ′[α 7→ 〈λx . e, ρ ′〉]
e2, ρ[` 7→ α],σ ′′ ⇓Epc σ ′′′,v
(let-label ` e1 e2), ρ,σ ⇓Epc σ ′′′,v
Obs
e1, ρ,σ ⇓Epc σ ′, ` e2, ρ,σ ′ ⇓Epc σ ′′,v
〈(λx . e), ρ ′〉 = σ ′′(`)
e, ρ ′[x 7→ v],σ ′′ ⇓Epc σ ′′′,v±
e3, ρ,σ
′′′ ⇓Epc σ ′′′′,v ′
v ′′ = obs(`,v ′,v±)
(obs e1 e2 e3), ρ,σ ⇓Epc σ ′′′′,v ′′
(Possibly-Faceted Application) (v1 v2), ρ,σ ⇓Apc σ ,v
App-?
(?v), ρ,σ ⇓Apc σ ,?
App-Base
e, ρ ′[x 7→ v],σ ⇓Epc σ ′,v ′
(〈λx . e, ρ ′〉 v), ρ,σ ⇓Apc σ ′,v ′
App-Split
{+`,−`} ∩ pc =  (v+ v), ρ,σ ⇓Apc∪{+` } σ ′,v+ ′
(v− v), ρ,σ ′ ⇓Apc∪{−` } σ ′′,v−′ v ′ = 〈〈 {+`} ?v+ ′  v−′ 〉〉
(〈 ` ?v+  v− 〉 v), ρ,σ ⇓Apc σ ′′,v ′
App-Facet-Pos
+` ∈ pc
(v+ v), ρ,σ ⇓Apc σ ′,v ′
(〈 ` ?v+  v− 〉 v), ρ,σ ⇓Apc σ ′,v ′
App-Facet-Neg
−` ∈ pc
(v− v), ρ,σ ⇓Apc σ ′,v ′
(〈 ` ?v+  v− 〉 v), ρ,σ ⇓Apc σ ′,v ′
Fig. 2. Semantics of Faceted Execution
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〈〈  ?v+  vd 〉〉 = v+
〈〈 {+`} ∪ rest ?v+  vd 〉〉 = 〈 ` ? 〈〈 rest ?v+  vd 〉〉  vd 〉
〈〈 {−`} ∪ rest ?v+  vd 〉〉 = 〈 ` ?vd  〈〈 rest ?v+  vd 〉〉 〉
write(σ ,α ,pc,v) = σ [α := 〈〈pc ?v  σ (α) 〉〉]
write(σ , 〈 ` ?v1  v2 〉),pc,v = σ ′′ where σ ′ = write(σ ,v1,pc ∪ {+`},v)
and σ ′′ = write(σ ′,v2,pc ∪ {−`},v)
Fig. 3. Meta-functions used in our semantics
e reduction relation e, ρ,σ ⇓Epc σ ,v reduces an expression, environment, and store to a resulting store and
value. e rst three rules (all in blue) are unchanged from the standard interpretation in the lambda calculus.
e Apply rule calls out to the helper relation (v v), ρ,σ ⇓Apc σ ,v , which applies a possibly-faceted value to an
argument: if the value being applied is a plain (unfaceted) closure, the App-Base rule (in blue, as it is unchanged
from the lambda calculus) applies it and returns immediately to the ⇓Epc relation.
In the case that a faceted value is applied, ⇓Apc performs one of three functions, based on the relation of ` to pc .
If there is no occurrence of either +` or −` in pc , then the semantics has not yet branched on `, and therefore
must split the application. To do this, it applies both the positive and negative branches aer extending pc . Aer
reducing both branches to values, the results are formed into a facet. If +` ∈ pc , then the semantics has already
branched on the label `, so spliing would be redundant. In this case, ⇓Apc simply selects the positive branch to
apply and continues without spliing. e symmetric case occurs in App-Facet-Neg. Facet formation follows
this paern, accounting for the relation of ` to pc .
e rules Box, Unbox, and Set appear similar to the standard implementation of boxes, but employ several
meta-functions to do their work. is is because box creation, reads, and writes may occur within a privileged
context, and care must be taken to form facets when pc is nonempty. To understand why, consider the following
example1:
1 (define x (box 0))
2 (if (= (facet alice 0 1) 0)
3 (set! x 0)
4 (set! x 1))
5 (unbox x)
If we do nothing special to account for the fact that the program branches on the facet, control ow implicitly
launders the value through the box to an unfaceted value. To x this, we form a facet by taking into account
pc and forming a facet using the meta-function 〈〈 ` ?v+  vd 〉〉. is meta-function is dened in Figure 3, and
takes three arguments: the current pc , a positive view (v+), and a “default” view (vd ). Facet construction builds a
facet with a spine corresponding to all of the labels in pc , and inserts v+ at the focus corresponding to pc , puing
the default value vd along all other branches. In the box form, the facet uses a default value of ?. In terms of our
above example, this means that along the positive branch x would be set to 〈 alice ? 1  ? 〉 (as the false branch
of the if is taken), and along the subsequent negative branch x is extended to 〈 alice ? 1  0 〉.
Label creation allocates a label as a fresh address in the store, binding the specied label predicate and adding
it to the environment. Labels must be store-allocated rather than bound in the lexical environment, as the laer
would allow the label to be rebound by anyone using the facet:
1Our formal semantics elides if, though it may be obtained via a Church encoding if desired as in Austin et al.[1]. Our implementation
includes if but not other constructs such as cond
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1 (define alice-label (let-label l (λ (x) (= x alice)) l))
2 (define x (facet alice-label 1 0))
3 (let ([ alice-label (let-label l (λ (x) #t) l)])
4 (obs alice-label 1 x)) ; Should return 〈 alice-label ? 1  0 〉
e obs form in the above example ought to return 〈 alice-label ? 1  0 〉. But if we pull labels from the lexical
environment, the binding on line 3 shadows the policy originally associated with the facet.
Last, observation evaluates the label expression to an address and executes the associated predicate. Once
this is done, Obs uses the obs meta-function to select the appropriate branch based on the value returned by the
predicate associated with the label. is meta-function accounts for the fact that the label being observed may
appear arbitrarily deep in the facet (or not at all). As our implementation of obs is unchanged from its denition
in [1], we elide it here.
4 FACETED EXECUTION AS MACROS
e semantics of faceted execution is an extension of the lambda calculus, leading to a natural question: can we
use Racket’s macros [9, 13] to extend Racket to faceted execution? We will see that the answer is yes, and the
translation from the big-step rules is surprisingly straightforward. is section of our paper describes the design
of Racets, a prototype implementation of faceted execution using Racket macros. In Section 7 we remark upon
current directions scaling Racets to the whole of Racket.
Choosing a Representation for Facets, Labels, and Program Counters. In seing out to implement facets, we must
rst choose how we will represent facets, labels, and program counters. We have chosen to implement facets
simply as Racket structs, containing a label along with positive and negative branches:
1 (struct facet (labelname left right))
Next, we must choose a representation of labels. At rst consideration, it appears sensible to represent labels
simply as closures. Aer all, labels are simply used as predicates testing whether or not to reveal a facet’s positive
or negative branch. erefore, we represent labels as a pair of a name and a policy:
2 (struct labelpair (name pol))
Now that we have dened labels, we can dene branches, which are positive or negative labels:
3 (struct pos (lab))
4 (struct neg (lab))
Similarly, program counters are sets of branches. However, we must still ask how we will keep track of the
“current” program counter. Our implementation uses Racket’s parameters, though other mechanisms (such as
continuation marks [? ], to which parameters macro-expand) can also be used. Racets denes the parameter
current-pc, and updates it as computation progresses:
5 (define current-pc (make-parameter (set)))
Facet Creation. Facet creation appears as three separate rules in Figure 2, which we recapitulate here in three
distinct colors for each case:
Fac-Create-Pos
e1, ρ,σ ⇓Epc σ ′, ` +` ∈ pc
e2, ρ,σ ⇓Epc σ ′′,v
(fac e1 e2 e3), ρ,σ ⇓Epc σ ′′,v
Fac-Create-Neg
e1, ρ,σ ⇓Epc σ ′, ` −` ∈ pc
e3, ρ,σ ⇓Epc σ ′′,v
(fac e1 e2 e3), ρ,σ ⇓Epc σ ′′,v
Fac-Create-Split
e1, ρ,σ ⇓Epc σ ′, ` {+`,−`} ∩ pc = 
e2, ρ,σ
′ ⇓Epc∪{+` } σ ′′,v1
e3, ρ,σ
′′ ⇓Epc∪{−` } σ ′′′,v2 v = 〈〈pc ?v1  v2 〉〉
(fac e1 e2 e3), ρ,σ ⇓Epc σ ′′′,v
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6 (define-syntax-rule (facet l e1 e2)
7 (cond
8 [( set-member? (current-pc) (pos (facet-labelname l))) e1]
9 [( set-member? (current-pc) (neg (facet-labelname l))) e2]
10 [else
11 (let ([left (parameterize
12 ([ current-pc (set-add (current-pc)
13 (pos (facet-labelname l)))]))]
14 [right (parameterize
15 ([ current-pc (set-add (current-pc)
16 (neg (facet-labelname l)))]))])
17 (mkfacet (set-union (set (pos (labelpair-name l)))
18 (current-pc))
19 v1 v2))]))
Fig. 4. Facet creation as a macro
Translating these rules to Racket involves observing that each one will apply under one of three disjoint
circumstances (each of them boxed in the above rules): +` ∈ pc , −` ∈ pc , or else {+`,−`} ∩ pc = . is is a
common idiom in our faceted semantics, as we oen want to select the appropriate branch of a facet if its label
already exists in pc .
At rst glance, it may not be obvious that we even need a macro for facet creation. But according to our
semantics, the following snippet should produce #t if +` ∈ pc:
(facet l #t (error "this␣shouldn 't␣get␣evaluated␣if␣+` ∈ pc"))
If we were to implement fac as a function, it would force evaluation of the negative branch, inconsistent with
the semantics of Fac-Create-Pos. We can implement each of these conditions as a Racket macro by considering
whether ` ∈ pc , as shown in Figure 4. Each color in the listing corresponds to the analogous semantic rule. e
implementation of Fac-Create-Pos and Fac-Create-Neg is relatively straightforward, but Fac-Create-Split
extends pc for each branch and subsequently forms a facet. is function implements canonicalizing facet
construction, and (as the implementation is a transliteration of that in Figure 6 of Austin et al. [1]) we omit its
denition here.
Label Creation. As we chose a representation of labels as pairs of symbols (the label’s name) and closures (the
predicate corresponding to the label), label creation is relatively straightforward from the semantics:
20 (define-syntax-rule (let-label l (λ xs e) body)
21 (let ([l (labelpair (gensym 'lab)
22 (λ xs e))])
23 body))
Faceted Boxes, Writes, and Observations. Our faceted semantics includes explicit box and unbox forms. is
diers from Racket’s semantics, where any variable may be treated as a box due to assignment conversion. We
have two main options:
• Introduce an explicit unbox form in Racets, trusting the programmer to explicitly use our implementation
of unbox on potentially-faceted objects.
• Walk over Racket code (aer macro-expansion via local-expand) transforming variable references to use
explicit unbox forms from Racets.
For our prototype of Racets, we have chosen to implement the rst. is leads to a relatively simple imple-
mentation, but essentially trusts the programmer to use Racets’ unbox forms when necessary.
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24 (define-syntax (ref-set! stx)
25 (syntax-case stx ()
26 [(_ var e)
27 #`(let ([v e])
28 (let write ([var var]
29 [pc (current-pc)])
30 (if (box? var)
31 ; write(σ ,α ,pc,v)
32 (set-box! var (construct-facet (current-pc) v (unbox var)))
33 ; Else split
34 (mkfacet
35 (facet-labelname (unbox var))
36 ; write(σ ,α ,pc ∪ {+l},v)
37 (write
38 (facet-left (unbox var))
39 (set-add pc (pos (facet-labelname var))))
40 ; write(σ ,α ,pc ∪ {−l},v)
41 (write
42 (facet-right (unbox var))
43 (set-add pc (neg (facet-labelname var))))))))]))
Fig. 5. Racets’ implementation of set!
Racets denes a box macro, along with unbox and set!. We include the denition of set! in Figure 5, which
inlines the denition of the write metafunction from Section 3 to consider the case under which a facet is used
when an address is expected.
Facet observation is handled similarly, rst evaluating the label to produce a policy predicate, followed by
evaluating the policy’s argument and a possibly-faceted value to observe. Aer applying the policy its argument,
we produce the value v± and descend down the facet until reaching either a base value or nding the selected
label (at which point we select the appropriate branch).
Faceted Function Application. By now we can anticipate a predictable paern for implementing faceted execution:
check pc to decide whether to branch le, right, or split. is is largely our strategy for handling faceted function
application, with a small twist: we need to be able to apply functions from outside of Racets. For example, if we
want to apply builtin functions such as display, we need to be mindful of the fact that these functions cannot
work with faceted arguments.
To handle this, we implement a macro for the λ form, to tag Racets closures specically (so that they are
dierentiated from functions outside of the current module). In the case that a foreign function is applied to
a faceted value, our implementation of function application wraps the function to be able to handle facets by
distributing the function through each branch of the facet.
In general it is unsafe to apply an unknown function to a faceted value. is is because the unknown function
may leak the facet’s private information as a side-eect. erefore, our current implementation of Racets allows
programmers to apply external functions, but does not make any guarantee of safety. A beer strategy may be to
perform an obs before each call to a potentially-unsafe function. In general, we believe module interactions are a
challenging problem in faceted execution, and we leave its study to future work.
5 IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
We have implemented Racets as a set of Racket macros which can be employed as a language using Racket’s
#lang reader facility. So far, we have included macros for many of Racket’s core forms including application,
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
Fig. 6. Screenshots from our Baleship case study.
if, λ, and references. We leave others (including continuation marks) to future work. Additionally, Racets does
not support rst-class control. ere has been recent work in handling exceptions in the context of faceted
execution [2], however reconciling rst-class control in general remains (to our knowledge) an open problem.
Because of Racket’s exible macro system, our implementation of faceted execution is much smaller than other
systems: our core macros comprise roughly 170 source lines of Racket, with another 120 lines of library code to
perform various facet-related functions.
Our implementation is currently available on Github at hps://github.com/fordsec/racets
Case Study: Baleship in Racets. To gain perspective on how Racets enables policy-agnostic programming, we
scaled our implementation from Section 2 to a web-based game of Baleship wrien in Racets. Our implementation
uses Racket’s web-server framework [14], which denes an API for writing HTTP-based server applications.
Figure 6 shows several screenshots of our Baleship application. e rst screenshot 6a shows the board as
viewed by player 1 (using the route /player1/player1), while the second shows the empty board observed
when player 2 aempts to view player 1’s board. e screenshot in 6c shows the response seen by player 2 upon
a successful hit. Finally screenshot 6d shows player one’s board with the ship on (2, 3) removed.
When running, our game server provides several routes that a user can access:
1 (define-values (dispatch generate-url)
2 (dispatch-rules
3 [("player1" (string-arg)) player1board]
4 [("player2" (string-arg)) player2board]
5 [("player1strike" (string-arg)) p1strike]
6 [("player2strike" (string-arg)) p2strike ]))
e route /player1/<id> (or /player2/<id>) renders player 1’s game board when viewed as <id>. We facet
game boards with policies that reveal player 1’s board when <id> is player1, and do the same with player 2:
7 (define p1l (mkpol "player1"))
8 (define p1board
9 (box (facet p1l
10 (add-pieces (makeboard) '(1 2 ldots))
11 (makeboard))))
e board is explicitly made into a box: this is because the board’s state will change as player 2 makes moves
and eliminates pieces from their board. e player1board function implements the logic to render player 1’s board
as an HTML table. e argument viewer corresponds to the <id> route argument, and is passed to player1board
by the framework. is argument is then used to observe the board game
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12 (define player1board
13 (ext-λ (request viewer)
14 (http-response "<h1>Player␣1's␣Game␣Board</h1 >"
15 (pretty-print
16 (obs p1l name (deref p1board))))))
e implementation of player1board uses a special form ext-λ, discussed at the end of this section, to allow
code from Racets to be executed by the framework (which is not prepared to execute faceted code).
e function p1strike allows player 1 to make a guess as to the position of ships on player 2’s board. e
function parses the position into two coordinates and then calls mark-hit to perform the hit, updating player 2’s
board and then observing the result to answer (to player 1) whether the result was a hit or not:
17 (define p1strike
18 (ext-λ
19 (request position)
20 (let* ([x (char-to-num (string-ref position 0))]
21 [y (char-to-num (string-ref position 2))]
22 [ans (mark-hit p2board x y)]
23 (set! p2board (car ans))
24 (http-response
25 (if (cdr (obs p2l "player2" ans))
26 "<h1>Congratulations!</h1 >␣<h4>You␣hit␣player␣2!</h4>"
27 "<p>No␣hit␣:(</p>")))))))
Note that we need to use an explicit obs form on line 25. is is because—as p2board is a facet—the result will
also be a faceted value. When we want to display the output to player 1, our code needs to explicitly observe the
answer, as http-response cannot accept a faceted value.
Module Interactions in Racets. ere is a wealth of existing Racket code we may like to incorporate into Racets
programs. For example, our case study uses the web-server framework for building web applications. However,
in general, we believe that interacting with code not wrien using faceted execution is a challenging open
problem, and we do not know of any principled solutions in the literature.
One immediate problem in Racets is how to pass functions from Racets to plain Racket code. For example,
the web-server framework is wrien in Racket, and does not know how to call tagged closures from Racets.
As a stopgap, we added an ext-λ form to Racets. is form allows creating a Racket-style lambda in Racets that
will be used by functions in other modules, necessary for the implementation of our case study.
We plan to explore interactions with unfaceted code more in the future, and believe it will an exciting direction.
For example, once execution escapes Racets, we have no guarantee that the privacy policy won’t be violated.
One solution may be to implicitly perform an obs based on the current pc at points where Racets interacts with
unfaceted modules. But we do not fully understand the ramications or ergonomics of this choice, and suspect
there may be a wide array of design choices to handle these module interactions including security type systems
and blame (to track which module violated the privacy policy).
6 RELATED WORK
To the best of our knowledge, we are the rst authors to present an implementation of faceted execution using
hygienic macros. ere are several threads of related work in dynamic information ow and programming
paradigms for information ow.
Information-ow was rst formalized by Denning [7]. In her seminal work on a laice model for information
ow, she outlined challenges and potential solutions to static information-ow checking. Subsequently, Goguen
and Meseguer [10] dened noninterference, which formalized the idea that privileged data should not inuence
publicly observable outputs. Clarkson and Schneider [5] later recognized that information-ow properties t
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into a class of program properties that could not be characterized by a single trace of a program, but rather a set
of traces, and called these hyperproperties.
Along with denitions of information ow, there has also been signicant interest in mechanisms for enforcing
information ow. is work can be broadly divided into static and dynamic enforcement mechanisms for
information ow security. Of the mechanisms for static information ow, security type systems have gained the
most use. First introduced by Volpano and Smith [21], these type systems augment the binding environment
to track the privilege of variables and prevent writes to variables that would violate noninterference. Myers
leveraged this idea to produce Jif, a variant of Java with an information-ow type system [16]. Security type
systems have been subsequently extended to accommodate concurrent programs [24] and ow sensitivity [11].
Faceted execution does not require annotating the program with security types, but at the expense of losing a
static characterization of the program’s security in its type system.
Devriese and Piessens [8] rst introduced secure multi-execution as a dynamic enforcement technique for
information ow. Secure multi-execution runs 2k copies of a program in parallel, where each run represents a
subset of ℘(Prin), where Prin is a set of principals. For example, if the principals in the program are Alice and
Bob, secure multi-execution executes four copies of the program: one that replaces all secret inputs by ⊥, one
that replaces Bob’s input by ⊥ but Alice’s input by the true input, one for Bob’s input, and one with access to all
privilaged information. When external eects are made (e.g., writing to disc), the runtime can select which variant
to use based on a policy. Secure multi-execution prevents information ow violations at runtime by ensuring that
observations which violate the information-ow policy receive a view of the data computed without access to the
secret inputs. Secure multi-execution has been extended in a variety of ways, e.g., scaling to its implementation in
web browsers [4], adding declassication in a granular way [18], and even preventing side-channel aacks [12].
As the number of principals increases, secure multi-execution’s overhead increases exponentially, unnecessarily
duplicating work not inuenced by secret inputs. Austin et al. introduced faceted execution as an optimization of
secure multi-execution in [1]. Instead of treating the whole program as a potentially-secret computation, faceted
execution realizes that inuence can be tracked and propagated in a granular way using facets. Notably, Austin
et al.’s work does not include rst-class labels, as it was simulating secure multi-execution, where the principals
could not be dynamically generated.
At the same time, Yang et al. rst implemented Jeeves, a language allowing policy-agnostic programming [23].
Policy-agnostic programming takes the view that programs should be wrien without regard to a particular
privacy policy, because as the policy changes, correctly updating program logic is cumbersome and error-prone.
Policy-agnostic programming was rst implemented in the domain-specic language Jeeves, using an SMT solver
to decide which view of secret data to reveal based on a policy. Later, both authors collaborated to implement
Jeeves using faceted execution. [3]. is formulation includes rst-class labels, and is the basis for our concrete
semantics.
Several other eorts into dynamic analysis for information ow are worth noting. Stefan et al. [20] rst
presented LIO—a monad (with implementation in Haskell) that tracks privilege of the current program counter
and forbids eects that would violate the security policy. It may be surprising that LIO works well for Haskell
programs, given that faceted execution is more precise than LIO—allowing values to become faceted rather than
halting the program. One key dierence is that Haskell programs emphasize purity while languages such as
JavaScript (the original target of faceted execution) does not, so much of the machinery for faceted execution’s
eect on the store is less interesting. Several authors have implemented related systems to LIO, including variants
of faceted execution [19] and variants of LIO that extend its power to arbitrary monad transformers [17]. We
believe that it would be possible to implement a variant of our technique that would give similar insights to
programs using LIO, though much of the interesting machinery for handling state may be unnecessary.
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7 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have reviewed the operation of faceted execution, a linguistic paradigm enabling policy-agnostic
programming, and showed how it may be implemented within the Racket programming system as a library of
macros. As Racket macros permit core language forms (including function application, λ-abstraction, conditionals,
mutation, etc.) to be rewrien arbitrarily, it is possible to modify the meaning of these forms to support a faceted
semantics directly. We call our prototype system Racets: Racket with Facets.
e advantage of this approach is that faceted, policy-agnostic, programs may be wrien directly in Racket,
making use of the wealth of Racket code already available. A central challenge of this then, is how to ensure there
is a sound (w.r.t. secure multi-execution) and practical inter-operation between Racets and standard Racket
(or other languages wrien as libraries in Racket). Our approach to this has been to use a tagging scheme that
identies values from Racets so untagged values may be treated by Racets as originating from a non-Racets
language. For example, a pure Racket function that is not tagged, being applied at a #%app form in Racets, can be
automatically lied to support FE (so that it can split when applied on a faceted value).
Our hypothesis is that this tagging scheme is key to permiing inter-operation between Racets and Racket,
and we have implemented a faceted, web-based game of Baleship to explore this idea. We suspect that a more
thorough investigation of likely idioms for faceted, non-faceted module interaction is needed and that purely
functional code plays a special role as a degenerate case where arbitrary non-faceted code may be lied to operate
over facted values without potential unsoundness. In the future, we plan to explore these design choices in a
more principled way and also to scale a static analysis [15] of faceted execution to fully expanded Racket so it
may be applied directly to Racets.
REFERENCES
[1] omas H. Austin and Cormac Flanagan. 2012. Multiple Facets for Dynamic Information Flow. In Proceedings of the 39th Annual
ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages (POPL ’12). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 165–178. DOI:
hp://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2103656.2103677
[2] omas H. Austin, Tommy Schmitz, and Cormac Flanagan. 2017. Multiple Facets for Dynamic Information Flow with Exceptions. ACM
Trans. Program. Lang. Syst. 39, 3, Article 10 (May 2017), 56 pages. DOI:hp://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3024086
[3] omas H. Austin, Jean Yang, Cormac Flanagan, and Armando Solar-Lezama. 2013. Faceted Execution of Policy-agnostic Programs. In
Proceedings of the Eighth ACM SIGPLAN Workshop on Programming Languages and Analysis for Security (PLAS ’13). ACM, New York, NY,
USA, 15–26. DOI:hp://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2465106.2465121
[4] N. Bielova, D. Devriese, F. Massacci, and F. Piessens. 2011. Reactive non-interference for a browser model. In 2011 5th International
Conference on Network and System Security. IEEE, 97–104. DOI:hp://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ICNSS.2011.6059965
[5] M. R. Clarkson and F. B. Schneider. 2008. Hyperproperties. In 2008 21st IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium. IEEE, 51–65.
DOI:hp://dx.doi.org/10.1109/CSF.2008.7
[6] John Clements, Mahew Fla, and Mahias Felleisen. 2001. Modeling an Algebraic Stepper. In Proceedings of the 10th European
Symposium on Programming Languages and Systems (ESOP ’01). Springer-Verlag, London, UK, UK, 320–334. hp://dl.acm.org/citation.
cfm?id=645395.651947
[7] Dorothy E. Denning. 1976. A Laice Model of Secure Information Flow. Commun. ACM 19, 5 (May 1976), 236–243.
[8] D. Devriese and F. Piessens. 2010. Noninterference through Secure Multi-execution. In 2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
(Oakland ’10). 109–124. DOI:hp://dx.doi.org/10.1109/SP.2010.15
[9] R. Kent Dybvig, Robert Hieb, and Carl Bruggeman. 1992. Syntactic Abstraction in Scheme. Lisp Symb. Comput. 5, 4 (Dec. 1992), 295–326.
DOI:hp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01806308
[10] J. A. Goguen and J. Meseguer. 1982. Security Policies and Security Models. In 1982 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. 11–11. DOI:
hp://dx.doi.org/10.1109/SP.1982.10014
[11] Sebastian Hunt and David Sands. 2006. On Flow-sensitive Security Types. In Conference Record of the 33rd ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT
Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages (POPL ’06). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 79–90. DOI:hp://dx.doi.org/10.1145/
1111037.1111045
[12] V. Kashyap, B. Wiedermann, and B. Hardekopf. 2011. Timing- and Termination-Sensitive Secure Information Flow: Exploring a New
Approach. In 2011 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (Oakland ’11). 413–428. DOI:hp://dx.doi.org/10.1109/SP.2011.19
, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article 1. Publication date: January 2016.
1:14 • Micinski, Wang, and Gilray
[13] Eugene Kohlbecker, Daniel P. Friedman, Mahias Felleisen, and Bruce Duba. 1986. Hygienic Macro Expansion. In Proceedings of the
1986 ACM Conference on LISP and Functional Programming (LFP ’86). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 151–161. DOI:hp://dx.doi.org/10.1145/
319838.319859
[14] Jay McCarthy. Web Applications in Racket. (). hps://docs.racket-lang.org/web-server/index.html (Accessed 7/23/18).
[15] K. Mikinski, D. Darais, and T. Gilray. 2019. Abstracting Faceted Execution.. In (In submission to) SIGPLAN Symposium on Principles of
Programming Languages.
[16] Andrew C. Myers. 1999. JFlow: Practical Mostly-static Information Flow Control. In Proceedings of the 26th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT
Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages (POPL ’99). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 228–241. DOI:hp://dx.doi.org/10.1145/
292540.292561
[17] James Parker. 2014. LMonad: Information Flow Control for Haskell Web Applications. Master’s thesis. University of Maryland, College
Park, Maryland.
[18] W. Rafnsson and A. Sabelfeld. 2013. Secure Multi-execution: Fine-Grained, Declassication-Aware, and Transparent. In 2013 IEEE 26th
Computer Security Foundations Symposium. 33–48. DOI:hp://dx.doi.org/10.1109/CSF.2013.10
[19] omas Schmitz, Dustin Rhodes, omas H. Austin, Kenneth Knowles, and Cormac Flanagan. 2016. Faceted Dynamic Information Flow
via Control and Data Monads. In Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Principles of Security and Trust - Volume 9635 (POST
’16). Springer-Verlag New York, Inc., New York, NY, USA, 3–23. DOI:hp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-49635-0 1
[20] Deian Stefan, Alejandro Russo, John C. Mitchell, and David Mazie`res. 2011. Flexible Dynamic Information Flow Control in Haskell.
In Proceedings of the 4th ACM Symposium on Haskell (Haskell ’11). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 95–106. DOI:hp://dx.doi.org/10.1145/
2034675.2034688
[21] Dennis M. Volpano and Georey Smith. 1997. A Type-Based Approach to Program Security. In Proceedings of the 7th International
Joint Conference CAAP/FASE on eory and Practice of Soware Development (TAPSOFT ’97). Springer-Verlag, London, UK, UK, 607–621.
hp://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=646620.697712
[22] Jean Yang, Travis Hance, omas H. Austin, Armando Solar-Lezama, Cormac Flanagan, and Stephen Chong. 2016. Precise, Dynamic
Information Flow for Database-backed Applications. In Proceedings of the 37th ACM SIGPLAN Conference on Programming Language
Design and Implementation (PLDI ’16). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 631–647.
[23] Jean Yang, Kuat Yessenov, and Armando Solar-Lezama. 2012. A Language for Automatically Enforcing Privacy Policies. In Proceedings
of the 39th Annual ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages (POPL ’12). ACM, New York, NY, USA,
85–96. DOI:hp://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2103656.2103669
[24] S. Zdancewic and A. C. Myers. 2003. Observational determinism for concurrent program security. In 16th IEEE Computer Security
Foundations Workshop, 2003. (CSF ’13). 29–43. DOI:hp://dx.doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.2003.1212703
, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article 1. Publication date: January 2016.
